IAEA releases its 15th report on Iran JCPOA commitments
London, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Yukiya Amano in his 15th report stressed verification of Iran's nuclear deal under the UNSC Resolution 2231.
Earlier, Iranian Ambassador to the International Organizations Kazem Gharib Abadi described the 15th report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on verifying implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as Iran's good will to preserve multilateralism in international relations and as an evidence for complying with its commitments.
He added that the new IAEA report referred to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) as regard stopping some of the commitments based on the articles 26 and 36 of the nuclear deal.
The report also mentioned resuming production of heavy water in Arak Heavy Water Reactor Facility, he noted.
The full text of the IAEA's new report is as follows:
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclearrelated commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
It also provides information on financial matters, and the Agency's consultations and exchanges of information with the Joint Commission, established by the JCPOA.
2. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclearrelated commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA (GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1, para. 8).
In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclearrelated commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. The Board of Governors also authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1.
3. In December 2016 and January 2017, the Director General shared with Member States nine documents, developed and endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission, providing clarifications for the implementation of Iran's nuclearrelated measures as set out in the JCPOA for its duration.
4. On 8 May 2019, Iran issued a statement, including, inter alia, that in implementation of its rights set forth in Paragraph 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran has issued an order to stop some of Iran's measures under the JCPOA from today.
5. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclearrelated commitments as set out in the JCPOA is Euros 9.2 million per annum. For 2019, extra budgetary funding is necessary for Euros 4.0 million of the Euros 9.2 million.
As of 28 May 2019, Euros 5.0 million of extra budgetary funding had been pledged to meet the cost of JCPOArelated activities for 2019 and beyond.
C. JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities
6. Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclearrelated commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA, consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices, and in an impartial and objective manner.
The Agency reports the following for the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.
C.1. Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing
7. Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR40 Reactor) based on its original design.
Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).
8. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran's heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15).
On 26 May 2019, the Agency verified that, following a halt in the production of heavy water at the HWPP between 15 April 2019 and 22 May 2019,14 operation of the plant had resumed and that Iran's stock of heavy water was 125.2 metric tonnes.
Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).
9. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras 18 and 21).
C.2. Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel
10. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 52 IR1 centrifuges from those held in storage17 for the replacement of damaged or failed IR1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).
11. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF6 at FEP.18 Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U235 (para. 28).
12. Throughout the reporting period, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56).
The quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.
13. As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran's uranium enriched up to 3.67% U235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
14. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), no more than 1044 IR1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46). On 29 May 2019, the Agency verified that 1020 IR1 centrifuges were installed in six cascades.
On the same date, the Agency also verified that ten IR1 centrifuges were installed in a layout of 16 IR1 centrifuge positions and one IR1 centrifuge was installed in a single position, 23 for the purpose of conducting initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production.
Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear
material at the plant (para. 45).
15. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).
The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71).
The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).
16. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its longterm enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).
17. On 26 May 2019, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one meter in air).
18. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of reconverting fuel plates or scrap into UF6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).
C.3. Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory
19. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran's enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges specified in the JCPOA (paras 32�42).
20. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1).
The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2).
Iran has not produced any IR1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).
21. All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70).
Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.
D. Transparency Measures
22. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1).
Iran has issued longterm visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency,
provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).
23. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at
Esfahan (para. 68). Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).
E. Other Relevant Information
24. Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force.
The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.
Timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing such access facilitates implementation of the Additional Protocol and enhances confidence.
25. The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclearrelated commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I of the JCPOA.
26. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).
27. The Agency continues to verify the nondiversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement.
Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran remained ongoing.
28. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclearrelated commitments under the JCPOA.
29. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Source: Islamic Republic News Agency IRNA