New York: Amid an evolving and challenging international security landscape, speakers in the Security Council underscored the continued relevance of its Committee tasked with monitoring and supporting efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.
According to EMM, delegates welcomed the Committee's efforts in training, capacity-building, and assistance to Member States, but called for an end to the political deadlock hampering the Committee's work, including the adoption of its programme of work and the appointment of experts to vacant posts. Some divergence of views emerged regarding export controls and the peaceful use of technology and nuclear materials.
On 28 April 2004, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The text obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using such weapons and their means of delivery.
In the ensuing debate, many delegates emphasized the enduring importance, relevance, and viability of the Committee's work—especially as international non-proliferation architecture is under threat—with France's representative stressing that the risks of proliferation have never been higher. The global strategic context has been weakened by the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, during which crowd control agents and possibly other chemical agents were used as weapons of war in clear violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran's and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's proliferation crises are worsening, in defiance of international law, while the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is being challenged.
Similarly, the representative of Panama, Council President for August, expressed concern about the risk that non-State actors—who have sufficient financial resources—could access materials and knowledge to develop such weapons. He quoted Mohamed El-Baradei, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former IAEA Director General, emphasizing that concerns about proliferation cannot be used, exaggerated, or ignored for geopolitical purposes, noting that legal norms must be applied consistently without double standards.
The threat of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors remains as real today as it was two decades ago, emphasized Algeria's delegate—a threat evolved and intensified by rapid technological advancement, including artificial intelligence (AI). Accordingly, he underscored the need to maintain the delicate balance between legitimate peaceful uses of technology and other materials for development and socioeconomic progress, and the imperative to prevent their misuse by non-State actors.
Citing difficulties some Member States face in obtaining technical expertise and implementation capabilities, delegates including Sierra Leone and the Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of technical assistance—with the latter calling on the Committee to organize capacity-building activities. He noted his Government had helped finance Committee activities in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, including the national workshop in Nigeria in April 2025 and the African points of contact training course in Ethiopia in November 2024. The Committee must remain attentive to developments in emerging science and technology and consider whether the 1540 matrix template—last revised in 2017—adequately addresses a shifting landscape in that domain.
China's representative called on the international community to earnestly fulfill responsibilities and obligations towards establishing a just, equitable and non-discriminatory non-proliferation and export control order. Further, all countries have a legitimate right to benefit from advancements in the peaceful uses of science and technology in the context of international security. In the pursuit of non-proliferation objectives, the international community must commit to lifting restrictions for peaceful use on developing countries and foster international cooperation.
Somalia's representative welcomed enhanced cooperation between the Committee and international, regional, and subregional organizations—partnerships indispensable for facilitating the sharing of expertise, technical assistance, and helping countries meet their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). He applauded the Committee's robust outreach efforts, including organizing targeted training courses for points of contact in Asia-Pacific and Africa. Similarly, Guyana's delegate welcomed the announcement by Panama of its intention to host a training course for 1540 points-of-contact in Latin America and Caribbean by the end of the year.
While multilateral export control regimes could play a crucial role in strengthening global non-proliferation efforts, Pakistan's representative underscored that—to maintain credibility—these regimes must avoid cartelization and should not be seen as exclusive clubs prioritizing political and commercial interests. Rather than advancing political objectives masked as non-proliferation concerns on a selective basis, efforts should focus on collective interests to promote global and regional strategic stability, he noted. Additionally, the inalienable right of all countries to utilize nuclear energy and technologies for peaceful purposes must be respected, he stressed, reiterating Pakistan's proposal to establish an all-inclusive open-ended working group under UN auspices to ensure equitable access to technologies and to address denial cases that hinder development.
Several delegations including Greece emphasized the need for the Committee and Group of Experts to function properly, with the United Kingdom's representative expressing concern that unwarranted objections from some Committee members have prevented the Group of Experts from attending outreach events to focus on specific thematic and regional issues related to implementation. She called for the immediate reversal of any such action which hinders the Committee's vital work. Similarly, representatives of Denmark and Slovenia lamented that the Committee could not adopt its programme of work for 2025.
The Russian Federation's delegate—while emphasizing that delays in Committee work only aid those who seek to undermine international non-proliferation—noted that certain resolution provisions impose serious obligations on national authorities. These should not be used as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of States, and the Committee must act strictly within its mandate. Imposing on the Committee functions that are not its own, including control and oversight, is unacceptable, as is artificially introducing topics including the fight against terrorism, digital development and information security, and sanctions-related issues.
Committee successes are overshadowed by persistent obstructionism stressed the United States delegate—threatening its ability to fulfill its mandate. The Russian Federation hindered the participation of the Group of Experts in 1540-related events, trainings and conferences, particularly those sponsored by Western countries or addressing sensitive topics such as synthetic pathogen development or chemical weapons investigations. Moscow also recently objected to the participation of a 1540 Committee Expert in the stakeholder forum on national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. China has also complicated the Committee's work, he stated, preventing consensus on the 2025 programme of work by promoting a false narrative on the impact of non-proliferation export controls on commercial trade—a misleading campaign that spreads disinformation to developing countries. He called for such obstruction to cease, with his counterpart from China taking the floor again to reject such a claim.