Washington: The United States recently signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, described by the US Department of Energy as historic. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the Section 123 agreement under the Atomic Energy Act, supplemented by a bilateral safeguards agreement. Such agreements typically pave the way for American reactors, American nuclear fuel, and American oversight.
According to TRTworld.com, the agreement has sparked a heated debate because it allegedly allows Saudi Arabia to independently enrich uranium on its own soil, according to several American media outlets. There is a sense of d©j vu following the signing of the agreement and the subsequent chatter, as this scenario has been seen before but now presented in a different context. For nearly two decades, the architecture built around Tehran's nuclear program viewed Iran as an isolated problem, but this perspective was flawed as the region's dynamics are far more complex.
Israel has had an undeclared nuclear arsenal for decades, acknowledged by nonproliferation experts, even as Tel Aviv adheres to a policy of deliberate ambiguity. Gulf states have longstanding security concerns that predate the current standoff with Iran. The attempt to view Iran's enrichment program as a standalone issue has led to the current asymmetry. A security architecture focused solely on one country's agenda is unsustainable, merely a temporary construct waiting to be tested.
Restricting one country while enabling another does not constitute a nonproliferation policy but rather a policy of selectivity, drawing harsh criticism. US President Donald Trump recently stated on Truth Social that "there will be no enrichment of materials," insisting that Saudi Arabia would only receive civilian unenriched nuclear facilities. However, the US Department of Energy's official statement on the agreement does not address uranium enrichment, while publications citing Congressional documents suggest the agreement allows this possibility.
Senator Ed Markey has introduced the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, requiring Riyadh to formally abandon uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing before the deal takes effect. Nonproliferation researcher Kelsey Davenport noted that nuclear cooperation could either strengthen or undermine the nonproliferation regime, depending on undisclosed details. This situation highlights a double standard, with one state enforcing sanctions and policies against another over uranium enrichment while discussing similar opportunities for another state in the same region.
The emergence of Saudi Arabia's uranium enrichment program, even if described as civilian, shifts Tehran's focus. The question now is why Tehran should comply with restrictions not imposed on its Gulf rival. Saudi Arabia's mutual defense treaty with nuclear-armed Pakistan and the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold raise regional tensions.
Once Saudi Arabia establishes a credible technical pathway, the UAE may also seek renegotiation of its 2009 nuclear agreement with Washington, which explicitly gave up enrichment and reprocessing rights. Israeli analysts note that regional proliferation spreads through neighboring states demanding equal terms. Iran, the Gulf states, and Turkey, with its civilian nuclear strategy, cannot ignore these developments.
The regional balance of power is recalibrating through bilateral deals rather than an agreed international mechanism, creating potential dangers. This situation recalls Turkey's 2010 Tehran Declaration with Brazil, which involved Iran transferring low-enriched uranium in exchange for nuclear fuel. The principle that peaceful nuclear technology rights and trust-building exchanges, not sanctions and ultimatums, should prevail remains relevant.
Regional nuclear crises become more dangerous when managed through unilateral pressures and unequal deals. A unified system integrating the entire region, verifiable and fair to all, is necessary. Turkey's past approach to Iran, emphasizing peaceful nuclear rights and trust, is worth reiterating to Washington and Riyadh to prevent this deal from rewriting regional rules unfavorably.